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IINTRODUCTION
The purpose of this part is to apply the basic method of projecting
business and financial requirements under full-employment
conditions, outlined in general terms in Part 1 of the paper, to a spe-
cific segment of the business population for a selected future period of
time. It should be stressed at the outset that the projected figures and
remarks that follow are based on 1) certain assumptions concerning
future business and economic conditions, and 2) certain relationships
among the various aspects of business and financial behavior as reflected
the statistics covering prior. years.
The projected figures should in no sense be considered forecasts or
predictions. There is no discussion in this paper of either the problem of
transition from the present to the projected level of manufacturing spend-
ing and financing, or of the relationship between the manufacturing activ-
*Theauthor gratefully acknowledges the help of Edgar M. Hoover and Burton H.
Klein, of the Council of Economic Advisers, in preparing this part of the article.
The conclusions, however, are the author's own.
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itywithwhich the projections are concerned and the achievement or lack
of achievement of the assumed full-employment conditions.
The segment of American business selected for analysis is the universe
of manufacturing corporations. This selection was made mainly because
more adequate financial statistics are available in this area than in any
other. The time period chosen for the analysis is the five-year period
1950-54. The annual average sources and uses of funds of these corpora-
lions are projected for this period.
The computations assume conditions of relatively full employment in
the nation over the next five years; specifically, conditions similar to those
that characterized 1948. They assume no cyclical depression or recession
and subsequent recovery: in other words, a period of relatively stable
economic growth. The development of a sizable cyclical fluctuation in
business during this period would, of course, alter the figures and con-
clusions significantly. The method utilized, however, is flexible enough to
take account of different sets of assumptions regarding future business
conditions. The assumptions have been adopted in part for reasons of
simplicity, but also in part because steady growth can be thought of as a
goal for the economy.
The computations are in terms of average 1949 prices. In that year
the wholesale price index of commodities other than farm products and
foods was about 80 percent above that1939 and 4 percent below its
postwar peak in late 1948. An assumption of a moderate increase in prices
would raise expenditures and financial requirements somewhat, but would
not significantly alter thç basic conclusions of this study. This would not,
of course, be true if prices rose substantially again, say as they did during
the years 1945-48.
This study is based on aggregate data of all manufacturing corpora-
tions considered as a group, and therefore has the shortcomings of all
analyses based on aggregates. The results are not necessarily applicable to
groups of corporations within major or minor industrial divisions, or to
size groups of manufacturing, or to individual manufacturing corporations.
Analyses similar to that made here could and should be made for narrower
segments of the population of manufacturing corporations. Such future
studies would not only provide useful information on the expenditures and
financial requirements of the more specific segments of the population of
manufacturing corporations, but would also provide data to test the sig-
nificance of the use of aggregate data for this type of analysis. It could very
well be true that as the economy grows, shifts of activities and financing
among significant manufacturing industries or among manufacturing cor-A PROJECTION FOR MANUFACTURING 123
porations of varying size would invalidate analyses utilizing aggregate
data.
More specifically, this second part of the article attempts to answer
questions such as the following: Under relative prosperity and a stable
growth of business, what would be the required volume of expenditures
by manufacturing corporations on plant, equipment, inventory accumula-
tion and customer financing, on the average, over the next five years? How
large could their profits, retained earnings and internal financing be ex-
pected to be? Under conditions such as these, what volume of funds would
they require from such outside sources as banks, insurance companies,
mortgage and security markets? What volume of equity financing through
stock sales would be required in order to maintain a sound equity-to-debt
relationship?
The specific way in which the basic method outlined earlier was used
is described in Section II of this paper. It involved projecting the dollar
volume of sales of manufacturing corporations from projections of manu-
facturing production and the gross national product. The different types
of expenditures, or uses of funds, of these corporations, such as plant
and equipment outlays, inventory accumulation and financing,
were then estimated, in the main, on the basis of these projected sales data.
These estimates involved principally projections of historical relationships
between each of the different types of expenditures and sales.
The projected volumes of funds available from suppliers (increase in
trade debt) and from internal financing (undistributed profits and depre-
ciation allowances) were estimated on a similar basis. The difference be-
tween the volume of expenditures and that of trade and internal financing
was assumed to be the additional outside financing required from such
sources as banks, insurance companies, and the mortgage and securities
markets. The breakdown of this additional outside financing into debt
and equity money was determined in such a way as to maintain the present
debt-to-equity ratio of manufacturing corporations.
Basically, this method involves the criterion that the financiaj position
of manufacturing corporations, measured by the debt-to-equity ratio, does
not deteriorate. The method is, of course, flexible enough to permit sub-
stituting other debt-to-equity ratios or financial criteria other than the
debt-to-equity ratio.
Average, high, and low projections of spending, profits, and internal
and external sources of funds have been made. That is to say, separate
sets of projections of funds have been included in the
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1) Average uses and average internal sources of funds and the result-
ing external sources
2) High uses and high internal sources of funds and the resulting
external sources
3) Low uses and low internal sources of funds and the resulting
external sources
4) High uses and low internal sources of funds and the resulting
external sources
Other combinations of assumptions could be developed to test other
possible hypo.theses. The ones included in the text should be considered
only as illustrative.
IITHE DERIVATION OF THE PROJECTIONS
Many of the projected specific expenditures and sources of funds of manu-
facturing corporations were made on the basis of an assumed relationship
of such variables to changes in tne dollar volume of manufacturing sales.
It was felt that the change in sales was a reasonable measure of changes in
the operating, or transactions, needs of these enterprises and that many
business expenditures and financial requirements varied with such chang-
ing needs.
The projections of manufacturing sales were derived from a projected
index of manufa'cturing production, which in turn was derived from pro-
jections of the gross national product. The derivation of the production
index from the gross national product was made by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, using the techniques developed in the Inter-Industry Relations
Study, sometimes referred to as the "input-output" study. Since it was
assumed that there would be no significant price change, sales were pro-
jected to increase proportionately with the production index.
A gross national product of $305 billion was assumed for 1954. This
is the mid-point in the range of the gross national product as projected by
the Council of Economic Advisers in its current studies of economic
growth objectives for the economy. It allows for only minor variation in
prices from the 1949 level. A gross national product of $305 billion in
1954 would mean a 21 percent increase in the physical volume of marlu-
facturing output over 1948, a year of relatively full employment, according
to the "input-output" calculations of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.1
Assuming no significant change in prices from 1949 through 1954, this
These calculations assumed some slight decrease in manufacturing and increase in
service activity from 1948 to 1954.A PROJECTION FOR MANUFACTURING 125
levelof manufacturing production by 1954 implies a level of manufac-
turing sales of $247 billion in 1954 and $227 billion on the average during
the years
The projection of each of the specific expenditures and financial
sources were derived as follows.
PLANT AND EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURES
The projections of plant and equipment expenditures were based on the
combination of methods developed at the Council of Economic Advisers
and described in Part I of this paper. These methods involved 1) the
use of the McGraw-Hill survey data on capacity and actual and antic-
ipated plant and equipment outlays classified by utilization either for
expansion or replacement and modernization, 2) the historical relation-
ship between plant and equipment outlays and growth in capacity as
indicated by growth of output between selected years of presumed high
utilization of capacity, and 3) extension of long-term trends and. the rela-
tionship between expenditures and the gross national product and indus-
trial production.
All three methods yield surprisingly similar results, namely a projec-
tion of annual average outlays in 1950-54 of between $6.3 and $6.8
billion. This range is 5-10 percent below actual expenditures in 1949 and
20-25 percent below peak annual postwar expenditures in 1948 expressed
in 1949 prices.
The low projection of plant and equipment expenditures used in this
paper is $6.8, and the high, $7.3 billion. The additional half billion dol-
lars has been added to the computed range on the assumption that condi-
tions more favorable to business investment will prevail during the next
five years than in the past, and that such conditions will tend to speed up
replacement and modernization. In addition, it was felt that over the next
five years a somewhat higher volume of plant and equipment expenditures
by manufacturing corporations than was indicated by the computed range
would be necessary as one of the private investment outlets for private
saving, in order for the assumption of reasonably full employment to be
at all tenable. The estimated average used in this paper in the case of plant
and equipment expenditures, as well as other types of business spending
and sources of financing, is the mean of the high and low estimates.
SELECTED ITEMS OF WORKING CAPITAL
The projected annual additions to. inventories, accounts receivable (cus-
tomer financing), cash holdings, and accounts payable (financing by
trade suppliers) over 1950-54 were computed on the assumption that126 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
Table 1
DERIVATION OF PROJECTED INC1 EASES IN SELECTED WORKING CAPITAL ITEMS
OF MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, ANNUAL AVERAGE




Low projection (change in sales/16) $.6
Highprojection (change in sales/13) .8
Receivables
Low projection (change in sales/12) .8
High projection (change in sales/8) 1.3
inventories
Low projection (change in sales/7) 1.4
High projection (change in sales/5) 2.0
Trade Payables
Low projection (change in sales/21) .5
High projection (change in sales/12) .8
Based on Appendix Tables 2 and 3. Low projection divisors are ratios of sales vol-
ume in 1949 to year-end holdings of cash, notes and accounts receivable, inventories,
and accounts payable, respectively, as given in Appendix Table 3; high projection
divisors are averages of the 1938-39 ratios for each of these accounts. Average
annual change in sales is calculated from the 1949 sales figure shown in Appendix
Table 2 and the projected 1954 sales figure of $247 billion.
each of the items would increase with the dollar volume of sales, that is,
with operating or transactions requirements. Past relationships of each of
the items with sales were computed in the main from Treasury Department
compilations of balance sheets of all manufacturing corporations as pub-
lished in Statistics of Income, Part 2, brought up to date by data obtained
from the Department of Commerce.
For the low projections of the annual increases in these variables it was
assumed that they would rise with sales in approximately the same propor-
tion as had been maintained between the volume of each of the items on
hand at the end of 1949, and 1949 sales. These projections are shown in
Table 1. The 1949 relationship of each of these variables to sales was below
that prevailing in the immediate prewar years.
For the high projections of the annual increases in inventories, re-
ceivables, cash and payables, it was assumed that these items would
increase relative to sales in the same proportion as their volume on hand
rose in the immediate prewar years relative to sales in those years. No pro-
vision was made for building the volume of each of the items on hand at
the end of 1949 back up to its relationship with sales before the war. The
decision not to make such, a provision was based on the assumption that atA PROJECTION FOR MANUFACTURING 127
the higher projected level of sales, a smaller dollar volume of these selected
working capital elements would be required per dollar of sales.
Corporate income taxes payable at the end of each year were projected
applying an effective tax rate of 40 percent to the volume of profits
before taxes as projected in the next subsection. In the projections of
annual additions to U. S. government security holdings it was assumed
that manufacturing corporations as a group would "fund" their accrued
taxes in the form of government securities. That is to say, that they would,
on balance, purchase additional government securities each year to offset
the increase in their tax liabilities. This practice became quite common
among business corporations, particularly large ones, during the recent
war when tax liabilities were so large and grew so rapidly. Most corpora-
tions have continued to follow the practice in the postwar period. Thus it
was assumed for the purpose of this study that an increase in tax liabilities
was offset by an equal dollar increase in government security holdings.
PROFITS, TAXES AND DIVIDENDS
Profits before income taxes were also projected on the assumption that
they would vary with sales as they have in the past. The past relationship
was computed from data published by the National Income Division of
the Department of Commerce.2 Since it was assumed that prices would
vary in the future only slightly from the 1949 level, the profits figures used
in computing this relationship were adjusted to exclude inventory gains
and losses as 'measured by the inventory valuation adjustment of the
Department. So adjusted, profits before taxes were about 9 percent of
sales in 1949, 7 percent in 1937, and 8½ percent in 1929.
For the low projection of profits before taxes, an adjusted profits-to-
sales ratio of 6 percent was assumed, and for the high projection, a ratio
of 9 percent. Application of the lower of these ratios to the assumed
average annual dollar volume of sales over the next five years, however,
yielded a low estimate of average annual dollar profits before taxes about
25percentbelow profits in 1949 adjusted for inventory losses. It was
thought that such a low profits figure would be inconsistent with the other
projections, for example those on plant and equipment outlays, so a low
projection of profits 10 percent below those actually experienced in 1949
was chosen. The high projection of average annual profits before taxes is
about 15 percent above those in 1949. -
Bothlow and high projections of undivided profits, as is shown in
2 profitsdata published by the Department of Commerce are before the deduc-
tion of charges for depletion in order to make them comparable to other components
of the national income and gross national product series.128 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
Table 2
DERIVATION OF PROJECTED UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS OF MANUFACTURING
CORPORATIONS, ANNUAL AVERAGE
(dollar fIgures in billions and 1949 prices)
Annual Average
Low Projection
Profits before taxesb $16.2
Corporate incometaxes (40%) 6.5
Profits after taxes 9.7
Dividends (2/3profitsafter taxes) 6.5
Undistributed profits $ 3.2
High Projection
Profits before taxes' $20.4
Corporate income taxes (40%) 8.2
Profits after taxes 12.2
Dividends (2/3profitsafter taxes) 8.1
Undistributed profits $ 4.1
'Based on data in Appendix Table 2.
bEstimatedas 10 percent below profits before taxes in 1949 (i.e., the sum of ad-
justed profits before taxes and inventory valuation adjustment shown in Appendix
Table 2).
Estimated as 15 percent above the adjusted figure on profits before taxes in 1949
or $18.9 billion plus inventory valuation adjustment in 1949.
Table 2, were based on the same assumptions concerning the proportion
of profits paid out in federal and state corporate income taxes and cash
dividends to stockholders. The projections assumed that 40 percent of
profits before taxes would be paid out as taxes and that two-thirds of profits
after taxes would be paid out as dividends. Over the past three years the
effective corporate income tax rate of all manufacturing corporations has
averaged 38 percent of profits before taxes, and dividends have averaged
about 40 percent of profits after taxes. However, dividends were over 80
percent of profits after taxes in 1937 and 65 percent in 1929. The low
rate of recent years has been due mainly to a large volume of expenditures
in this period.
DEPRECIATION
Projected average annual depreciation charges were derived by applying
an assumed rate of depreciation to a projected volume of gross plant and
equipment on hand. The rate was assumed equal to the estimated actual
rate of 3½ percent in 1949, computed from data published jointly by the
Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission
in their Quarterly Industrial Financial Report Series, adjusted on the basisA PROJECTION FOR MANUFACTURING 129
of selected information from the Treasury Department's publication,
Statistics of Income.3
The projected volume of gross plant and equipment on hand was com-
puted by adding to estimated gross plant and equipment on hand at the
end of 1949 new expenditures during each subsequent year, and sub-
tracting depreciation charges computed by multiplying gross plant and
equipment on hand at the beginning of a given year by 3½ percent. The
low and high estimates of depreciation charges were obtained by the use
of the low and high plant and equipment expenditures projected as
described above. Rounded off, they both come out to the same figure,
$3.4 billion per year.
OUTSIDE FINANCING OTHER THAN BY TRADE SUPPLIERS
The volume of outside financing other than trade debt was the residual
difference between total expenditures and the sum of the funds obtained
from trade suppliers and internal financing. This additional outside financ-
ing was divided into debt and stock financing in such a way that the
present debt-to-equity ratio of manufacturing corporations considered as
a group was maintained. No attempt was made to allocate the new debt
financing among bank loans, insurance company loans, mortgages, and
public bond sales.
The debt-to-equity ratio of manufacturing corporations at the end of
aTheQuarterly Industrial Financial Report Series contains data on 1) the volume
of plant and equipment plus land on hand, net of depreciation, and 2) depreciation
plus depletion charges. Statistics of Income data were used to estimate 1) gross
plant and equipment less land on hand and 2) depreciation charges separately. It
was necessary to exclude depletion charges, for they are included in profits as defined
by the National Income Division of the Department of Commerce.
According to the Financial Report Series, depreciation and depletion allowances
of all manufacturing corporations probably amounted to a little over $3.6 billion in
1949. According to Statistics of Income, depletion allowances alone were about 20
percent of depletion plus depreciation allowances in 1946, the latest year for which
such data are available. Thus, depreciation allowances alone probably totaled about
$3.0 billion in 1948.
From Financial Report Series data, it can also be estimated that the value of
plant, equipment and land net of depreciation and depletion reserves of all manu-
facturing corporations at the end of 1949 was about $41 billion. Statistics of Income
data indicated that the value of gross plant and equipment excluding land at the end
of 1946 was about double the value of plant and equipment plus land net of reserves.
Doubling $41 billion yields a value of gross manufacturing plant and equipment
(the depreciation base) at the end of 1949 of about $82 billion. This amount divided
by $3 billion, estimated depreciation allowances for 1949, yields a current average
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1949 was about 38 percent.4 It has declined somewhat since the end of
the war and is now considerably below its level during World War II. It is
still, however, somewhat higher than it was during the late twenties and
thirties. The past debt-to-equity ratios of manufacturing corporations were
computed from Statistics of Income data through 1946 and carried through
1949 on the basis of information obtained from the Department of
Commerce.
The fact that the present debt-to-equity ratio is somewhat higher than
it was before the war may be explained in part, at least, by the sharp post-
war price rise. As a result of this rise, a significant portion of the assets,
and hence the net worth, of manufacturing corporations is now recorded
on their books, and in their published financial statements, at a value
considerably below those prevailing in the current market. If all assets
were valued at market prices, the present debt-to-equity ratio would be
much lower. The assumption of the maintenance of prices at 1949 levels
would in and of itself probably tend to produce a lower debt-to-equity
ratio as lower-valued assets are replaced by higher-valued ones.
In terms of a criterion that measures financial strength more accurately
than the debt-to-equity ratio, namely the ratio of interest paid to income
available for the payment .of interest, manufacturing corporations have
recently been in a much better position than they were in either the late
twenties or thirties. In 1948 this ratio was 3 percent as compared with 9
percent in 1939 and 13 percent in In view of the present low level
of this ratio, it has been assumed that the present debt-to-equity ratio of
manufacturing corporations is not excessive, and that projected increases
in new outside financing could safely be in debt form to the extent that the
current debt-to-equity ratio is maintained.
IIITHE FINDINGS
The projections of annual expenditures and financial requirements of all
manufacturing corporations, on the average, over the next five years under
the assumptions stated in this paper are summarized in Table 3. Several
sets of figures are presented in Columns A through D involving different
combinations of average, high, and low projections of expenditures,
profits, internal funds and financing by trade suppliers to see what volume
of additional external financing would thereby be required.
It should be stressed again that these figures are projections on the
'See Appendix Table 3.
Monetary interest paid as defined by the National Income Division of the Depart-
ment of Commerce divided by profits before taxes plus monetary interest paid.132 RESEARCHIN BUSINESS FINANCE
basis of specific asumptions; they should in no sense be considered fore-
casts. To repeat, the main assumptions made were 1) that relatively full
employment conditions will be maintained in the economy, and 2) that
historical relationships will continue between (a) manufacturing spending
and general economic conditions, and (b) manufacturing spending, profit-
ability, and methods of financing.
Under these assumptions, a central finding on the projected expendi-
tures of manufacturing corporations is that, barring a specific price rise,
total expenditures on new plant, equipment and inventory accumulation
will be somewhat smaller over the next half decade than they have been in
the postwar period prior to 1949. This is the case whether we assume
average, high, or low expenditures of each type, as described previously
and as shown in Columns A, B, and C of Table 3. Assuming average ex-
penditures, the annual total would be only approximately two-thirds of
actual expenditures per year in 1946-48.
The decline in total spending would be due mainly to a reduced de-
mand for additional inventories. Large increases in outlays for inventory
accumulation have generally occurred in the past only when prices have
risen sharply or when a large real deficiency in the stock of goods on hand
has developed, for example as a result of a .war. Assuming an average
increase relative to sales (as was assumed in Column A of the table),
annual outlays on inventories in 1950-54 would only amount to about a
third of average annual outlays during the years 1946-48.
Under the assumed conditions, annual plant and equipment expendi-
tures during the coming five-year period, on the other hand, would come
closer to the level of recent years. The $7.0 billion average shown in Col-
umn A is only slightly below actual expenditures in 1949 and perhaps 15
percent below those of 1948 expressed in 1949 prices. (It was in 1948 that
plant and equipment expenditures of manufacturing corporations reached
their annual postwar peak.) This is true whether expenditures are con-
sidered in current year or constant prices. The high estimate of plant and
equipment expenditures in 1950-54, $7.3 billion, would be 3 percent
above 1949 outlays.
How would these expenditures be financed by manufacturing corpora-
tions under the assumptions made in this paper? One of the most
important findings regarding financing is that equity financing through
stock sales would have to be fairly significant relative to the actual volume
that has occurred in recent years in order to maintain the present debt-to-
equity relationship. Assuming average expenditures and internal financing
(Column A), an average annual volume of $700 million would have to
come from new stock sales. This is equal to the volume actually obtainedA PROJECTION FOR MANUFACTURING 133
by manufacturing corporations in 1947 and somewhat below the peak
annual volume of the postwar period obtained in 1946 when stock prices
reached their postwar high. The stock price index compiled by Standard
and Poor's Corporation and based on 416 common stocks averaged 140
in 1946 and 123 in 1947 (1935-39 =100).In May 1950 the index
averaged 147.
Under assumptions of high expenditures and internal sources of funds
(Column B), the volume of new stock sales would have to be somewhat
higher than $700 million, and with low expenditures and internal sources
(Column C), it would have to be somewhatiower. These volumes of new
stock financing seem to be reasonable possibilities of achievement in view
of the assumed course of profits and in view of the fact that the average
annual dollar volume of dividend payments in 1950-54 is projected at
more than twice the volume actually paid out in 1946.
Under the assumed conditions, the volume of internal financing, un-
distributed profits and depreciation allowances would be somewhat
smaller relative to total financing requirements in 1950-54 than it has been
in recent years. Whether average, high, or low expenditures and internal
financing are assumed, the ratio of internal to total financing would vary
from about 65 to 70 percent in 1950-54 as compared With 75 to 80 per-
cent in 1948 and, on the average, during the four-year period 1946-49.
Finally, Column D of Table 3 includes what might be considered the
maximum total requirements of manufacturing corporations for outside
financing during the next five years under the conditions assumed in this
paper. It is based on a high projection of expenditures and low projections
of both profitability and available volume of internal funds and trade
credit. Under these conditions, manufacturing corporations wOuld require
an annual volume of approximately $4 billion of outside financing in 19 50-
54, excluding that provided by trade suppliers. Slightly under half of this
sum would have to come from the proceeds of stock sales in order to




A careful reading of the statistical material in this paper will disclose
several inconsistencies from one table to another. It will also disclose
differences in data here presented from data published in other sources.
Since none of these inconsistencies and differences is serious enough to






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.138 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
eliminate them completely. The main reason for the discrepancies is
that there are several basic sources of financial statistics on manufacturing
corporations, namely, Statistics of Income of the Treasury Department,
the Quarterly Industrial Financial Report Series of the Federal Trade
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the na-
tional income statistics of the Department of Commerce. Because of
necessary differences in methods of collection and procedures of compila-
tion, these data can probably never be completely reconciled. However, a
thorough study of the possibility of making the basic data more consistent,




EVSEY D. DOMAR, The Johns Hopkins University
Rates of growth, saving, investment and similar concepts are pleasant
companions when you work with them theoretically and are free to make
any assumptions you wish. But on an empirical plane you find them stub-
born, elusive, and disagreeable. Whatever criticism I may express regard-
ing the paper by Messrs. Hoover and Klein could, I am sure, have been
easily made by them if the tables had been reversed.
The purpose of the paper is to estimate capital requirements under
conditions of "sustainable maximum employment" —inother words, to
find the "sustainable levels and patterns of business investment." The
expression "sustainable levels of investment" appears in the paper rather
frequently; so it does in recent reports of the Council of Economic Ad-
visers. But since the meaning of the term remains hardly explained, it is
not clear what capital requirements are being estimated.
It may be implied that if investment, as a percentage of gross or net
national product, does not exceed a certain magnitude (or perhaps if the
rate of growth of investment stays within certain limits), this magnitude
can be sustained year after year. But what is the basis for the belief that it
exists in the first place? Suppose it were established, say, at 15 percent.
Does it follow that if investment proceeded in this manner for n years, there
would be good reasons to expect a repetition of this performance for the
(n + 1) year? Investment motives in our society are extremely complex,A PROJECTION FOR MANUFACTURING 139
and I doubt very much that if, say, five years were endowed with the cor-
rect amount of investment, the sixth and subsequent years would be
assured of the same.
The idea of sustainable investment may mean, instead, that if invest-
ment proceeds at the correct rate, the economy remains in some sort of an
equilibrium in the sense that certain maladjustments Or disparities do not
arise. But the nature of these disparities remains to be explored.
The traditional approach to problems of this kind has consisted in
treating investment as an offset to savings; an estimate of the latter would
then appear as a first step. method was rejected by the authors for
the following reasons: 1) the limited state of knowledge about our saving
habits, 2) the difficulty of estimating all other offsets to savings besides
investment, and 3) the fact that no basis for further breakdown of invest-
ment by industries would be obtained.
The method, in one variation or another, actually used by the authors
consisted of the following steps:
1 A full-employment level of output or capacity was projected for-
ward at some rate of growth which was regarded as stable and easily
obtainable from historical data.
2 Investment requirements were then computed as a function of this
expected growth in output.
Thus "sustainable" investment, as the dependent variable, was made a
function of two independent variables: (a) the rate of growth of output,
and (b) the relation between the investment and the increment in capacity
resulting from it —whatI shall call the capital coefficient.
It is striking that in a long-range problem of this type the rate of growth
of capacity was assumed to be independent of the level of investment.
Suppose the "correct" annual amount of (gross) investment over the next
five years were estimated to average $40 billion. What will happen, how-
ever, if actual investment reaches only $30 billion? If the assumed rate of
growth of output can still be achieved, the remaining $10 billion of invest-
ment was evidently not needed. On the other hand, if the shortage of
investment has prevented the realization of the expected growth of output,
this growth cannot be treated as a variable independent of the level of
investment.
What if actual investment exceeded the "sustainable" level? The
authors seem to think that an excessive accumulation of capital and an
excessive productive capacity would result. But it is also possible that
additional investment would (via the multiplier process) bring about an
increase in output sufficiently large to absorb this capacity without creating140 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
any more trouble than would be created by a smaller amount of investment.
Is there no limit, then, to the amount of investment that an economy
can usefully absorb? It seems to me that such a limit exists, or more cor-
rectly, that there may be several limits.
First of all, unless we welcome an inflation, investment should not ex-
ceed the amount the community desires to save (with due allowance for a
possible government deficit). Thus the saving aspect enters the problem
after all. It would have come in, in any case, even if we had accepted
the idea of a sustainable level of investment, because the latter would have
to be compared with savings in order to make certain that both deflation
and inflation are avoided.
Secondly, there is the possibility that a high level of investment will
eventually result in an excessive accumulation of capital relative to the
available labor force. This presupposes, of course, that technological con-
ditions impose a rather rigid relation between the quantities of capital and
labor that can be utilized, a relation that cannot be quickly changed. This
assumption, implied or explicit, underlies a goodly number of recent busi-
ness cycle theories, particularly of the Keynesian variety, such as Hansen's,
Harrod's, Kaldor's, and others. Whether it is well founded or not is hard to
tell. It is possible to imagine some unreasonably large volume of invest-
ment, a good part of which will remain unused because of shortage of
labor; but whether we have ever been —orare likely to be —insuch a
position, and whether it would handicap further investment, is more
doubtful. After all, a good deal of capital is labor-saving by its very nature,
and thus acts as a labor substitute. If labor shortage of this type is not im-
portant, a considerable part of our recent thinking on the whole subject
has to be, I believe, reconsidered.
Finally, it is possible that in a capitalist society, the volume of private
investment over a given period of time is a function of technological
progress, changes in tastes and habits, and various institutional factors,
so that if a good deal is invested this year, not enough will be left for the
next. This does not imply that if more 4were invested next year, the in-
vestors would necessarily be disappointed; quite possibly they would not.
But if investmentdetermined by these exogenous factors, it has to be
used sparingly, so to speak, even though it may fall short of the limit
imposed by the community's desire to save and the availability of labor.
Thus there may be at least three distinct limits to the proper amount of
investment (besides limits to some measure of consistency in its internal
structure, of which the authors are perfectly aware). None of the three
criteria a sustainable level of investment in the sense that it can be
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Before much more empirical work is done in estimating the levels of
sustainable investment, a clarification of its nature is certainly desirable.
The second independent variable in the paper is the capital coefficient
already mentioned, that is, the relation between investment and the annual
increment in capacity resulting from it. Irrespective of the approach taken
to the problem —whetherwe start from the growth in labor productivity
or from the saving end —themagnitude of this coefficient has to be estab-
lished, and we hope that it will be found reasonably stable. For some
economists the use of this coefficient remains a taboo to this very day. If
capital is a convenient and frequent substitute for labor and vice versa,
and if this substitution depends primarily on their relative prices, which
happen to be flexible, the capital coefficient will hardly have much stabil-
ity. Those who try to estimate it betray their belief in its stability and
unquestionably commit an act of heresy against the established body of
economic theory —anact for which Messrs. Hoover and Klein deserve
congratulations. But the problem itself is large and difficult and I wonder
if it can be solved on the aggregate level. In manufacturing, for instance,
this coefficient may be as low as 2 or 1, while in housing it may rise to 8
or 10. Hence a change in relative weights may seriously affect its
magnitude.
If the capital coefficient has to be estimated on an aggregate level, I
imagine that in an empirical problem gross investment, rather than net,
would be relevant. After all, depreciation charges are usually aimed at
recovering the monetary value of the investment over an arbitrary number
of years and may not have much to do with physical productivity. If
productive capacity for a number of years were known, as well as gross
investment in plant, equipment and inventories in the intervening years,
an estimate could possibly be made. But I am somewhat puzzled about the
method referred to in the paper, which consists, if I understand it correctly,
of subtracting from this gross accumulation of capital a certain allowance
for a special depreciation so as to make the remainder proportional to
increase in capacity. This, it appears to me, may actually be assuming a
part of the answer to the problem.
An estimate of capital coefficients cannot, of course, be precise, and it
should not be precise. In no society does every piece of capital equipment
always work at its normal capacity. This is true even in Russia, in spite of
all their planning. In our economy errors are always made and will be
made. Competition among firms and industries implies by its very nature
sometimes gradual, sometimes sudden, replacements of some productive
apparatus by some other. This is what Schumpeter so aptly called "creative—
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destruction," but the magnitude of this destruction which is healthy and
useful is unfortunately unknown.
Mr. Koch's paper is an attempt to apply the Hoover and Klein tech-
nique to a particular industry, in this case to manufacturing. His findings
are of course based on the assumptions made, and since most of these
assumptions are stated the reader is free to accept or to reject them.
I was a bit puzzled about his very first step —theestimate of expendi-
tures on plant and equipment. This estimate was supposed to indicate
expenditures needed to satisfy some assumed rate of growth of output. Yet
he found it necessary to add to what he calls the "low projection" half a
billion dollars "on the assumption that conditions more favorable to busi-
ness investment will prevail during the next five years than in the past."
What does the estimate become then —amountof investment which
may be expected to take place under favorable business conditions? Yet he
had another reason for that addition —thesavings consideration. Is the
estimate then the amount of investment in manufacturing needed to absorb
a portion of total savings? These three concepts are not identical,
and the respective amounts may well differ by more than half a, billion.
Mr. Koch's estimate of undistributed profit appears to me to be on the
low side as compared with recent years. His assumption that two-thirds
of net profits after taxes are distributed in dividends may be somewhat
excessive, particularly if large investments are undertaken. And I was
rather surprised that his high investment estimate in 1950-54 was below
the investment of 1947 and 1948 and only slightly above that of 1949. Is
this due to the assumed "slight decrease in manufacturing" from 1948 to
1954 mentioned in footnote 1? Is the output of manufacturing expected
to decline in the absolute sense?
On the whole one gets an impression from the paper that Mr. Koch
regards the last three years as rather abnormal, and that his figures assume
a return to normality. Leaving war years aside, it was only during this
period out of the last twenty years that mass unemployment did not exist.
Perhaps the maintenance of full employment requires a certain degree of
abnormality. If so, the political situation appears to be most promising
in this respect.
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Comment:
0. J. FIRESTONE, Department of Trade and Commerce, Ottawa, Canada
I should like to comment on the observation made in connection with the
papers by Messrs. Hoover, Klein and Koch, that too great confidence can-
not be placed in the ability of businessmen to predict the quantities of
investment they are likely to 'make at a future period, particularly if this
future period is a year or longer.
We in Canada have had a bit of experience in this field. Over the last
five years the Department of Reconstruction and Supply, now the Depart—
ment of Trade and Commerce, has been undertaking surveys of invest-
ment intentions by both private and public agencies covering a period of
a year ahead. As far as the business sector is concerned, these surveys are
similar to those conducted by the SEC, with one important difference. We
in Canada try to cover all business establishments doing more than a mini-
mum amount of business (over $50,000 gross sales per annum), while
the SEC survey uses a sampling approach.
We have had pretty good response to our surveys, something like 75
percent of all business groups covered.' In the last few years business in-
vestment surveys in Canada have proved to be remarkably close. For
example, the results for 1949 show total business investment forecast to
come within 4 percent of actual realization.2
Our experience has been that in periods of high levels of economic
activity the businessman has proved to be a pretty good forecaster. How-
ever, I am willing to agree that the real test of how good businessmen as
a group are as forecasters has not yet been met. This test will come when
a downturn in economic conditions occurs. Whether the businessman will
remain as good a forecaster in times of declining economic activity as he
has been in times of rising levels of employment remains to be seen, and
I suppose only actual experience will give us an answer to that question.
'Private and Public Investment in Canada, Outlook 1950" (Department of Trade
and Commerce, Ottawa) p. 43.
2lbid.,p.46.